
Major-league managers have fewer visible strategic quirks than they once did. The numbers make that sameness hard to miss: teams now cluster around modest totals for sacrifice bunts and intentional walks, a long way from the managers who made those decisions a defining part of their style. The change matters beyond the box score. These choices were once a way for a manager’s preferences to become legible to fans, writers, and opponents; when they become uncommon, one of the easiest ways to describe a manager’s identity fades with them.
That shift came to mind after my colleague Patrick Dubuque observed that Baseball Prospectus has largely stopped quantifying managers. The annual’s remaining manager analysis, he wrote, amounts to a couple of pages that may persist more from habit than editorial conviction. That’s a pointed description of an editorial decision, but it also raises a broader question: what should analysis measure when the choices that once separated one skipper from another are made less often?
I took the remark personally. Years ago, an editor named Steven added manager comments and statistics to the annual, and I was proud of the work. But Patrick almost certainly wasn’t taking a shot at me. More to the point, his assessment rings true: the old managerial range has narrowed, and there’s little reason to preserve a feature simply because someone once valued it. A record of past work can be meaningful to its contributors without remaining useful to readers. That distinction is uncomfortable, but it’s part of editing.
Strategy by the numbers
This season, MLB teams recorded between nine sacrifice bunts, by the Tigers, and 45, by the Rays. That Tampa Bay total owes much to Taylor Walls. The league average was 23, roughly one bunt a week per team. The gap between the lowest and highest totals may look substantial at a glance, but both ends sit within a fairly narrow range when set beside the much larger seasonal totals associated with earlier managers. The average also gives the numbers a useful scale: bunting remains part of the game, but it’s no longer a routine feature of every team’s offensive approach.
Intentional walks were similarly restrained. The Astros led with 41, while the Rockies and Twins had 10 apiece; the average was 18. The article describes the intentional walk as a weapon of self-harm, and the low totals suggest managers are increasingly reluctant to hand an opponent a free baserunner. That reluctance is understandable as a general strategic tradeoff: an intentional walk avoids a particular matchup, but it also puts a runner on base without requiring the batter to earn it. The totals don’t tell us what happened in every individual situation, though. They show how often teams made the choice, not whether each choice was sound.
Those figures look especially restrained beside the habits of earlier skippers. Gene Mauch laid down 150 sacrifice bunts in a season in a league with the designated hitter. Leo Durocher ordered 75 intentional walks in a year. Those approaches belonged to managers whose strategic fingerprints were unmistakable. The raw totals don’t by themselves explain why either manager acted as he did, and comparisons across eras need that caution. Still, the contrast is clear: decisions that once appeared often enough to define a manager now occupy a smaller part of a team’s public identity.
What gets lost when managers converge
Baseball Prospectus once devoted considerable attention to measuring managerial choices. That work reflected a game in which managers were easier to distinguish by their decisions. Today, the narrow spread in common tactics points to a more uniform style of managing. When a tactic becomes rare across the league, counting it can still describe behavior, but it may say less about the differences between managers. A statistic can remain accurate while losing some of its explanatory power.
Here’s the thing: sameness in a few visible categories doesn’t prove that managers have become interchangeable. It tells us that sacrifice bunts and intentional walks offer less room to distinguish them than they once did. There may be other dimensions of managing that deserve attention, but identifying them takes more than preserving a familiar section and changing its title. The analysis has to make a clear case that the choices being measured still reveal something readers can use to understand the game.
I miss some of that older work, just as I miss plenty of things that have disappeared. Still, nostalgia doesn’t make a case for keeping a feature that no longer fits the game or its readers. The useful question now is whether analysis can find new ways to show where managers differ as the familiar tactical gaps keep shrinking.
What the shift means for analysis
This is more significant than it looks. A decline in visible quirks changes not only how managers act, but how writers can explain their influence. If a manager’s identity was once easy to summarize through a recognizable pattern of bunts or intentional walks, the same shorthand won’t carry as much weight when those tactics are uncommon. Analysis needs to distinguish between a decision that is rare because one manager favors it and a decision that is rare because nearly everyone has moved away from it.
And yet, uniformity can itself be worth documenting. If you're working in this space, the challenge is to ask what the numbers can support: whether they reveal a meaningful difference, a leaguewide habit, or simply a choice that has become less central. That kind of reporting may produce a shorter profile or a different set of measures. It may also produce a more useful account of the manager’s role, provided the evidence is there.
The old counts still have historical value. They help show how dramatically the visible mix of managerial decisions has changed, and they give readers a reference point for understanding why the annual once devoted more space to the subject. But historical value and current editorial value aren’t identical. (And this is the part most people overlook.) A feature can document an important change even as that change makes the feature less useful in its old form.
For now, the numbers leave a plain impression: the familiar tactical signatures are harder to spot. The next step for coverage is to find out whether managers still separate themselves in ways that can be measured and explained. If they do, the analysis should follow the evidence. If they don’t, a smaller role for manager statistics may be the honest account of the game as it’s played.