Adell’s assignment tells a larger story
Jo Adell batting cleanup in an elimination game says more about Cleveland’s lineup options than about Adell’s fit in the middle of an order. The Guardians used him as designated hitter and cleanup hitter in Game 6 against Tampa Bay, despite facing a right-handed starter. Cleveland lost and ended its season two wins short of the pennant.
Cleanup is a prominent spot, but the label alone doesn’t tell you whether a hitter belongs there. Teams can move a batter up to exploit a matchup, respond to injuries or absences, or simply try to put their best available options in the lineup. Cleveland’s decision appears to have been driven by the last of those constraints. That’s a meaningful distinction: a lineup card can make a player look like a central piece even when the club is short on better fits.
Adell’s place in Game 6 is therefore less a verdict on his ability than a snapshot of the roster Cleveland had available at the end. If you’re working in this space, the question isn’t only who batted fourth. It’s what the choice says about the alternatives around him.
Four different bets on the middle of the order
Oscar Gonzalez supplied the memorable moment in the 2022 Wild Card Series. Cleveland swept Tampa Bay, but the second game took 15 innings to decide: the teams were scoreless through 14 before Gonzalez hit a walk-off homer. He had started in right field and batted fifth. A week later, after that hit and a strong stretch, he moved up to fourth for Game 5 of the ALDS against the Yankees. Cleveland lost the series.
That sequence shows how quickly a postseason role can change. Gonzalez’s walk-off gave the club an unforgettable result, but one defining hit doesn’t by itself establish a hitter as a durable cleanup option. Cleveland had a short window between series to decide how to build its order, and the move reflected his recent production as well as the pressure to find offense. The Yankees series ended in defeat, though the result alone can’t tell us whether the lineup decision was sound.
Lane Thomas took the spot in 2024 after helping the Guardians beat Detroit in the ALDS. His case was more specific: he hit left-handed pitching well, so batting fourth made sense when Cleveland had the platoon advantage. The Guardians lost to the Yankees in five games in the ALCS.
Thomas’s example is the clearest of the four in terms of matchup logic. A platoon advantage can make a hitter more attractive for a particular game, even if his role changes when the opposing pitcher changes. That kind of choice is about the conditions in front of the team, not necessarily a declaration that the hitter should anchor the order every day. But when the assignment comes in October, a temporary fit can still carry the weight of a permanent one.
Last fall, Kyle Manzardo was the cleanup hitter in Cleveland’s Wild Card elimination game against Detroit. The young first baseman represented both a response to the immediate lineup and a bet on his potential as the long-term answer at the position. That promise didn’t turn into a lasting major-league role; he spent the final two months of the campaign with Triple-A Columbus.
Manzardo’s case brings the tension between present need and future projection into view. A club may give a young hitter a high-profile opportunity because it sees a path to a larger role, while also needing him to produce immediately. Those aims can coexist, but they aren’t the same. The postseason assignment showed what Cleveland needed at that moment; his later time in Columbus showed that the role remained unsettled.
Adell’s assignment was different. He was a midseason acquisition with some name recognition, but the article’s assessment is that his value had largely faded by season’s end. Nor did the matchup offer the platoon edge that could have supported the move. Cleveland appeared to have few better choices.
That makes the decision harder to read as a targeted advantage. A midseason pickup can fill a roster gap, but name recognition and past promise don’t automatically make a player the strongest option for a key spot months later. The Game 6 lineup may have reflected the limits of Cleveland’s available choices more than a clear belief that Adell was ideally suited to hit cleanup. And that’s the part most people overlook: the order can expose a roster problem without explaining how the team got there.
A recurring mismatch
Gonzalez was a lightly regarded international signing who took a winding route to the majors before producing value for Cleveland. Thomas was a platoon bat whose best use depended on the opposing pitcher. Manzardo was a prospect the team hoped would grow into a key role. Adell was an in-season pickup pressed into a prominent spot. Their paths differed, but each wound up batting cleanup with the season on the line.
The repetition is what makes the pattern worth examining. These aren’t four identical players, and the reasons for using them weren’t identical either. One had a dramatic postseason hit, another offered a specific matchup advantage, a third carried a prospect’s promise, and Adell arrived during the season. Still, Cleveland repeatedly turned to a player whose case for the role depended on circumstances, projection or scarcity.
The broader concern is that none looked like a natural fit for the job at the moment Cleveland gave it to them—and the article argues that each went on to become less effective the following season. The available text introduces a comparison of their numbers across those two seasons, but the statistics themselves aren’t included.
Without those figures, the claim about declining performance can’t be independently assessed here. The sequence may be suggestive, but it doesn’t establish that batting cleanup caused a later drop, or that all four players followed the same trajectory for the same reason. Postseason results are especially easy to overread: a handful of games can make a lineup choice look either inspired or misguided after the fact.
Even so, the repeated assignments point to a question about roster construction. Similar teams often have to balance everyday production with platoon flexibility and the development of younger players. When those pieces don’t produce a clear middle-order option, the manager may have to choose among imperfect fits. Cleveland’s choices suggest that, at least in these elimination games, no stable answer had emerged.
What the cleanup spot reveals
For Cleveland, the fourth spot has become a revealing postseason test: it shows whether the lineup has a dependable middle-order bat, or whether the team is asking a player to grow into the role under playoff pressure. Adell’s Game 6 start makes that question hard to ignore.
This is more significant than it looks. The cleanup hitter doesn’t have to be the team’s best player, and batting fourth doesn’t guarantee a particular number of chances or a favorable matchup. But the choice signals which hitter the club is willing to place near the center of its plan when there’s little room to recover. If that choice keeps changing, it may reflect flexibility. It may also reflect a persistent shortage of dependable options.
That said, one lineup spot can’t explain a season, and a loss in an elimination game doesn’t settle the argument. The more useful measure is whether Cleveland can identify a hitter who earns the role through sustained production, rather than relying on a short hot stretch, a narrow platoon advantage, or future potential. For now, the examples leave the answer unresolved. A question mark, carried into October.